9/11 Timeline
Key Events Only
Key Events Only
The Safari Club, a newly formed secret cabal of intelligence agencies, decides it needs a network of banks to help finance its intelligence operations, investigative journalist Joseph J. Trento will later report. Saudi Intelligence Minister Kamal Adham is given the task. "With the official blessing of George H. W. Bush as the head of the CIA, Adham transformed a small Pakistani merchant bank, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), into a worldwide money-laundering machine, buying banks around the world to create the biggest clandestine money network in history." BCCI was founded in 1972 by a Pakistani named Agha Hasan Abedi, who was an associate of Adham's. Bush himself has an account at BCCI established while he was still director of the CIA. French customs will later raid the Paris BCCI branch and discover the account in Bush's name. Bush, Adham, and other intelligence heads work with Abedi to contrive "a plan that seemed too good to be true. The bank would solicit the business of every major terrorist, rebel, and underground organization in the world. The intelligence thus gained would be shared with 'friends' of BCCI." CIA operative Raymond Close works closely with Adham on this. BCCI taps "into the CIA's stockpile of misfits and malcontents to help man a 1,500-strong group of assassins and enforcers." Soon, BCCI becomes the fastest growing bank in the world. Time magazine will describe it as not just a bank, but also "a global intelligence operation and a mafia-like enforcement squad. Operating primarily out of the bank's offices in Karachi, Pakistan, the 1,500-employee black network has used sophisticated spy equipment and techniques, along with bribery, extortion, kidnapping, and even, by some accounts, murder. The black network—so named by its own members—stops at almost nothing to further the bank's aims the world over."
November 1978–February 1979: Some United States officials want to support radical Muslims to contain Soviet Union
In December 1978, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says, "An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries." There is widespread discontent and rioting in Iran at the time. State Department official Henry Precht will later recall that Brzezinski had the idea "that Islamic forces could be used against the Soviet Union. The theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and so an arc of Islam could be mobilized to contain the Soviets." In November 1978, President Carter appointed George Ball head of a special White House Iran task force under Brzezinski. Ball recommends the United States should drop support for the shah of Iran and support the radical Islamist opposition of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This idea is based on ideas from British Islamic expert Bernard Lewis, who advocates the balkanization of the entire Muslim Near East along tribal and religious lines. The chaos would spread in what he also calls an "arc of crisis" and ultimately destabilize the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union. The shah will later comment in exile, "I did not know it then, perhaps I did not want to know? But it is clear to me now that the Americans wanted me out. Clearly this is what the human rights advocates in the State Department wanted. What was I to make of the administration's sudden decision to call former Undersecretary of State George Ball to the White House as an adviser on Iran? Ball was among those Americans who wanted to abandon me and ultimately my country." While there is later debate about what United States policy towards Iran actually is at this time, it will be noted that the Carter administration had "no clear policy" due to internal divisions and confusion. The shah abdicates on January 16, 1979, and Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile to Iran on February 1, 1979, taking over the government. Brzezinski will attempt to create a de facto alliance with Khomeini's new fundamentalist government, but his efforts will come to a half with the Iranian hostage crisis in November 1979.
1979–February 22, 2003: Al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia deeply penetrated by Indonesian government mole
Fauzi Hasbi, the son of a separatist leader in the Indonesian province of Aceh, is captured by an Indonesian military special forces unit in 1979 and soon becomes a mole for the Indonesian government. Hasbi becomes a leader in the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and he also plays a longtime role in Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate. For many years, he literally lives next door to Jemaah Islamiyah leaders Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Riduan Isamuddin. In 2005, the Australian television program SBS Dateline will present documents that it claims "prove beyond doubt that Fauzi Hasbi had a long association with the (Indonesian) military." For instance, military documents dating from 1990 and 1995 give him specific spying tasks. In February 2001, the Indonesian magazine Tempo documents some of Hasbi's links to the Indonesian military, after he has been linked to a major role in the Christmas bombings in Indonesia two months earlier. He admits to having some ties to certain high-ranking military figures and says he has had a falling out with GAM, but denies being a traitor to any militant group. Yet even after this partial exposure, he continues to pose as an Islamist militant for the military. A 2002 document shows that he is even assigned the job of special agent for BIN, Indonesian's intelligence agency. A December 2002 report by a United States think tank, the International Crisis Group, details his role as a government mole. He and two of his associates are abducted and killed in mysterious circumstances in the Indonesian city of Ambon on February 22, 2003. Seven suspects, including an Indonesian policeman, later admit to the killings but their motive for doing so remains murky.
Shortly After November 20, 1979: Bin Laden brother arrested over Medina mosque siege, Osama also possibly arrested
One or two of the bin Laden brothers are arrested over the attempted takeover of Masjid al-Haram in Medina. One of the brothers is Mahrous; the other is, according to journalist Steve Coll, "probably Osama." The mosque had been seized by about 500 rebels opposed to the Saudi royal family, led by a militant named Juhayman al-Otaybi. The rebels had used bin Laden company vehicles to stock ammunition and food in the mosque prior to its seizure, indicating some people at the company were sympathetic to them. According to one account, the two brothers are not held for long; a bin Laden company employee will say the arrest is a mistake as the arresting policemen wrongly think the two brothers are conspirators just because they are monitoring police radio traffic. Other accounts say that Mahrous, who joined a rebel group opposed to the Saudi government in the 1960s, is held for longer and only eventually released from prison because of the close ties between the bin Ladens and the Saudi royal family. Mahrous will abandon the rebel cause and join the family business, eventually being made a head of the Medina branch and a member of the board. He will still hold these positions on 9/11, although a newspaper will report that "his past (is) not forgiven and most important decisions in the (bin Laden family business) are made without Mahrous' input." Osama's position on the seizure of the mosque at this time is not known, although he will later criticize the Saudi king for noy negotiating a surrender. Coll will suggest that, although he is one of the most devout members of the bin Laden family at this time, he is not in league with the rebels as he is more concerned with his own material wellbeing. In contrast to Osama, several other family members, including Salem, Mustafa, Yahya, and Yeslam, work extremely hard to take back the mosque. As the bin Ladens actually renovated the mosque, they are able to provide the Saudi government with detailed plans to help their assault. After the rebels retreat underground, the family brings in equipment to drill holes in the floor, so that government troops can drop grenades down on holdouts.
December 8, 1979: Soviet forces, lured in by the CIA, invade Afghanistan
The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. The Russians were initially invited in by the Afghan government to deal with rising instability and military mutinies, and they start crossing the border on December 8. But on December 26, Russian troops storm the presidential palace, kill the country's leader, Hafizullah Amin, and the invitation turns into an invasion. Later declassified high-level Russian documents will show that the Russian leadership believed that Amin, who took power in a violent coup from another pro-Soviet leader two months ago, had secret contacts with the United States embassy and was probably a United States agent. Furthermore, one document from this month claims that "the right-wing Muslim opposition" has "practically established their control in many provinces ... using foreign support." It will commonly be believed that the invasion is unprovoked, but the Russians will subsequently be proved largely correct. In a 1998 interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, will reveal that earlier in the year Carter authorized the CIA to destabilize the government, provoking the Russians to invade. Furthermore, CIA covert action in the country actually began in 1978, if not earlier. The United States and Saudi Arabia will give a huge amount of money (estimates range up to $40 billion in total for the war) to support the mujahideen guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians, and a decade-long war will ensue.
Early 1980: Osama bin Laden, with Saudi backing, supports Afghan rebels
Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, with the advice and support of the Saudi royal family. Some, including Richard A. Clarke, counterterrorism "tsar" during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, believe he was handpicked for the job by Prince Turki Al-Faisal, head of Saudi intelligence. The Pakistani ISI want a Saudi prince as a public demonstration of the commitment of the Saudi royal family and as a way to ensure royal funds for the anti-Soviet forces. The agency fails to get royalty, but bin Laden, with his family's influential ties, is good enough for the ISI. Clarke will argue later that the Saudis and other Muslim governments used the Afghan war in an attempt to get rid of their own misfits and troublemakers. This multinational force later coalesces into al-Qaeda.
Early 1980 and After: Bin Laden serves as middleman between Saudi intelligence and Afghan warlords
As Osama bin Laden gets involved with the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan, he also develops close ties to the Saudi intelligence agency, the GIP. Some believe that Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki Al-Faisal plays a middleman role between Saudi intelligence and mujahideen groups. Turki's chief of staff is Ahmed Badeeb, and Badeeb had been one of bin Laden's teachers when bin Laden was in high school. Badeeb will later say, "I loved Osama and considered him a good citizen of Saudi Arabia." Journalist Steve Coll will later comment that while the Saudi government denies bin Laden is ever a Saudi intelligence agent, and the exact nature of his connections with the GIP remains murky, "it seems clear that bin Laden did have a substantial relationship with Saudi intelligence." The GIP's favorite Afghan warlord is Abdulrab Rasul Sayyaf, while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the Pakistani ISI's favorite warlord. Bin Laden quickly becomes close to both Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, even though the two warlords are not allies with each other. Some CIA officers will later say that bin Laden serves as a semi-official liaison between the GIP and warlords like Sayyaf. Bin Laden meets regularly with Prince Turki and Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz. Badeeb will later say bin Laden developed "strong relations with the Saudi intelligence and with our embassy in Pakistan. ... We were happy with him. He was our man. He was doing all what we ask him." Bin Laden also develops good relations with the ISI. Bin Laden will begin clashing with the Saudi government in the early 1990s.
1980–1989: $600 million for Afghan war passes through bin Laden charity fronts
From 1980 to 1989, about $600 million is passed through Osama bin Laden's charity fronts, according to Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA's first bin Laden unit. Most of it goes through the charity front Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which is founded in 1984. The money generally comes from donors in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and is used to arm and supply the mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan. Mohammad Yousaf, a high-ranking ISI official, will later say, "It was largely Arab money that saved the system," since so much of the aid given by the CIA and Saudi Arabia was siphoned away before it go to Afghanistan. "By this I mean cash from rich individuals or private organizations in the Arab world, not Saudi government funds. Without those extra millions, the flow of arms actually getting to the mujahideen would have been cut to a trickle." Future CIA Director Robert Gates will later claim that in 1985 and 1986, the CIA became aware of Arabs assisting and fighting with the Afghan mujahideen, and the CIA "examined ways to increase their participation, perhaps in the form of some sort of 'international brigade,' but nothing came of it." However, a CIA official involved in the Afghan war will claim that the CIA directly funded MAK.
October 1980: Osama's oldest brother allegedly involved in "October surprise"
Salem bin Laden, Osama's oldest brother, described by a French secret intelligence report as one of the two close friends of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud who often performs important missions for Saudi Arabia, is involved in secret Paris meetings between United States and Iranian emissaries this month, according to a French report. Frontline, which published the French report, notes that such meetings have never been confirmed. Rumors of these meetings have been called the "October surprise" and some have speculated that in these meetings, George H. W. Bush negotiated a delay to the release of the United States hostages in Iran, thus helping Ronald Reagan and Bush win the 1980 presidential election. All of this is highly speculative, but if the French report is correct, it points to a longstanding connection of highly improper behavior between the Bush and bin Laden families.
1980s: Much United States and Saudi aid meant for Afghan fighters goes to ISI and Abdul Qadeer Khan network
Much
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